I am reposting this paper by Dr. Francisco "Dodging" Nemenzo on the SCS territory conflict. He wrote this a decade ago. Dodong is former UP President and a highly respected academic political scientist. This is 9 1/2 pages long, enjoy.
Fishing for Trouble in the South China Sea
Francisco Nemenzo
Professor Emeritus in Political Science University of the Philippines
Lest I sound unpatriotic for striking a discordant note in a strident anti- China chorus, let me clarify what I understand by patriotism. It simply means standing for the national interest. This is not the same as supporting our government’s foreign policy even when it is wrong.
I consider China’s claim to own 90% of the South China Sea as preposterous. I agree that we should defend the islands we now occupy. And if we can afford it without begging for US intervention, we should fortify the ones we claim but have left unguarded.
What I deplore is the mishandling of our relations with China and our traditional reliance on the United States for our own security. Demonizing China and inciting jingoism among our people will only encourage the hardliners in the Chinese leadership and provoke the People’s Liberation Army to seize what we are too weak to defend, as happened in Scarborough.
Background of the territorial dispute
The South China Sea covers an area of 3.5 million square kilometers where more than 250 islets, shoals, atolls, cays, reefs, and sandbars are clustered in two archipelagos. The Paracels are contested by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The Spratlys are likewise claimed by the three, but parts are claimed also by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. These islands are small and most remain uninhabited; many are submerged at high tide. None is capable of sustaining human life, unless basic necessities are supplied from outside.
These geographic formations were ignored until 1968, when China’s Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources stumbled upon traces of petroleum and natural gas. The Chinese survey estimated the oil deposit at 17.7 billion tons. If validated, it will be the 4th largest reserve bed in the world. But succeeding surveys conducted by other countries give lower estimates. The actual volume remains a subject of conjecture.
Yet the conjecture was enough to spur a flurry of island grabbing. Taiwan grabbed the largest island, consisting of 46 hectares. At least nine other islands are now occupied by China, 28 by Vietnam, 11 by the Philippines, and seven by Malaysia. Brunei does not hold any of the islands it claims to own.
China and Taiwan cite ancient maps, chronicles of Chinese navigators, and miscellaneous pieces of discarded Chinaware. On this basis, the Kuomintang government (before its expulsion from the mainland) drew an eleven-dash line to demarcate China’s sovereign jurisdiction. The communist government inherited the eleven-dash line from the Kuomintang, but reduced it to nine as a friendly gesture to Vietnam when Vietnam was in the forefront of struggle against US imperialism. Now that China and Vietnam are no longer the best of friends, China infuriates Vietnam and the other claimants by insisting on the nine-dash line.
The nine-dash line is not recognized by the international community. Physical occupancy is the only ground for claiming sovereignty, not ancient maps, diaries and broken pottery. The Chinese cannot claim a territory just because they had been there centuries ago. Since they did not establish permanent settlements in these tiny islands, the Spratlys and the Paracels properly belong to public domain or the “world’s commons.”
Bones of contention
What made these god-forsaken islands a focus of international conflict today?
As noted earlier, the oil and gas reserves are still conjectural. What the numerous drillings have found so far is not worth a war. The Spratlys are rich in marine life; but a country need not own an area for its citizens to go there for fishing. Filipino, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Taiwanese fishermen have been fishing in the Spratlys since time immemorial without bothering about sovereign rights.
The main value of the South China Sea today is strategic. Some 300 ships cross it every day, making it the busiest sea-lane in the world; busier than the Suez and Panama canals combined. A mischievous nation that gains control of this maritime route can endow itself with authority to grant or deny passage to foreign ships.
China dreads the prospect of America policing the area. This is not a mere product of Chinese imagination. Still fresh in the memory of the Chinese is the US “containment” strategy during the Cold War, when mainland China was encircled with hostile military bases, including Subic and Clark. At that time, however, the encirclement did not pose as grave a threat to China because its foreign trade then was negligible.
But China today is a major industrial power. Foreign trade is now crucial to its economic life. Its trade with Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe goes through the South China Sea. Freedom of navigation in this trade route is therefore a matter of survival for today’s China. Understandably, China regards Barrack Obama’s strategy of “pivot to Asia” a potential menace to its security. From Beijing’s perspective, “pivot to Asia” is a revival of containment.
Who is aggressive?
Jingoistic Filipinos assert as indisputable truth that the current tensions in the South China Sea are due to China’s aggressiveness. But if we examine the sequence of events, China’s muscle flexing is a response to a US challenge, not the trigger of discord. China started demanding recognition of the nine-dash line only in 2009, a year after Obama unveiled the “pivot to Asia” strategy. Previously, China showed willingness to compromise.
For example, China signed the “UN Convention on the Law of the Sea” (UNCLOS), which recognized the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states around the South China Sea. (Incidentally, America refused to sign the UNCLOS.) Under this covenant, Scarborough and the Kalayaan islands fall within our exclusive economic zone. China did not question this until “pivot to Asia” threatened its national security.
In 2002, China also signed an agreement with the 10 ASEAN member states that designated the South China Sea as a zone of peace and neutrality. In the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” -- as the agreement was called -- China and the ASEAN reaffirmed their commitment to UNCLOS and to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. It also provided that: “Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities. These may include the following: marine environmental protection; marine scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue operation; and combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.”
That was the best compromise arrangement while the overlapping territorial claims remain unresolved. While it was in effect, the Philippine coast guard occasionally apprehended Chinese poachers without engendering tension because, under the Declaration of Conduct, protection of the marine environment was acknowledged to be a common concern. The Chinese embassy would ask for extradition of their nationals and we deported them without fuss or fanfare. Neither side raised the issue of sovereignty.
“Pivot to Asia” disturbed this fragile status quo. In the ensuing conflict, the real protagonists are China and the United States. To both of them, the core issue is control of the maritime route, not oil or gas.
Reliance on Big Brother
Why is the United States, a country on the other side of the Pacific, meddling in the South China Sea?
To understand America’s concern, we should see the connection between “pivot to Asia” and the financial crisis that hit America in 2008. Ironically, this crisis is the offshoot of America’s ambitious project of reshaping the world economy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, America and its G-7 allies1 used the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to compel the Third World countries to abandon their protectionist policies, deregulate their economies, and privatize state enterprises in order to create a global market where trade and investments can flow freely across national boundaries. This “new world order” --- as President Ronald Reagan triumphantly called it ---prompted the US corporations to relocate their manufacturing to China, tapping the latter’s
1 G-7 is an exclusive club of the most advanced industrial countries: the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan.
vast reservoir of cheap and docile labor. In turn, the state-owned Chinese banks acquired and amassed a huge bulk of US treasury bills.2
This scheme backfired in 2008, the end of George W. Bush’s presidency. When Obama inherited the crisis, among the bold steps he took was to pressure China to devalue its currency and adopt other measures to bring manufacturing activities back home and absorb the swelling ranks of unemployed.
Taking advantage of America’s predicament, China stubbornly refused to cooperate. Irked by this brazen defiance of American power, Obama decided to enhance America’s diplomatic leverage by projecting its military might in China’s vicinity. This is the root of “pivot to Asia.” The US augmented its forces in Japan, Korea and Guam, and expanded military ties with Singapore and Australia. The Philippine-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is part of this effort to coerce China.
At first I thought EDCA was another imperialist imposition. But my initial suspicion proved wrong. According to the preamble of EDCA, it was the Philippines that invited the US to install military facilities inside our military camps. In other words, we volunteered to join the mess.
This is a brainchild of Secretary Albert del Rosario who, since assuming office, has been advocating resumption of our “special relations” with the US that were damaged by the expulsion of US bases in 1991. He saw America’s renewed interest in Asia, especially its deepening conflict with China, as an opportunity to extract stronger American commitments.
Perceiving “pivot to Asia” as a revival of containment, China responded by consolidating its positions in the Spratlys and the Paracels. It began fortifying the islands it controls and building military structures in unoccupied islands, some of which are claimed but not occupied by the Philippines. I do not see this as aggressiveness. China knows it cannot match America’s naval strength. It therefore wants to avoid direct confrontation. But the Chinese find it convenient to find a US flunky they can bully around without drawing in the master. In other words, we are being used by China to show its opposition to “pivot to Asia” without risking
2 As of last November, China’s holdings of U.S. treasuries bills reached a record high of $1.317 trillion, according to the official website of the US Treasury Department.
a direct confrontation with the US. And the second Aquino government, prompted by Secretary Del Rosario, was foolish enough to get involved in the power play between two powerful nations.
The Scarborough standoff
Del Rosario’s ineptitude in managing an international conflict was amply demonstrated in the case of Scarborough.
The Scarborough Shoal is tiny and bare. It disappears at high tide, with only a couple of rocks protruding. It lies outside the Spratlys but inside the nine-dash line. Considering its physical contours, geologists are sure there is no petroleum or gas underneath. In bygone days Scarborough had a marginal strategic value as a landmark for ships entering Manila Bay. We used to maintain a lighthouse there, but abandoned it when it was falling apart and radar-equipped ships no longer need a lightgous. Left unoccupied, Scarborough was up for grabs.
It attracted Chinese attention in April 2012, when the Philippine navy accosted eight Chinese fishing vessels that were collecting rare corals, giant clams, and live sharks. This could have been handled through quiet diplomacy, following the protocol we followed in the past. This time, however, del Rosario sent a loud and insolent protest, asserting our sovereignty. The Chinese responded in like vein, asserting their claim based on the nine-dash line.
In support of del Rosario’s initiative, defense secretary Voltaire Gazmin dispatched to the area our newly acquired (but antiquated) warship BRP Gregorio del Pilar.3 This threat of military action played right into the hands of China. The Chinese confronted Gazmin’s miniscule fleet with 80 to 100 coast guard, research and fishing vessels. Unable to scare them off, BRP Gregorio del Pilar withdrew, giving as pretext an impending storm. The Chinese braved the storm, and as soon as our navy fled, they garrisoned Scarborough. Thanks to our macho posturing, the fishermen of Zambales lost access to a rich fishing ground.
3 Gregorio del Pilar was built for the US Coast Guard in 1967. It was decommissioned in 2011 and sold to the
Philippines as part of US military aid. The Philippine Navy refurbished it into a warship. President Aquino was embarrassed when it was inaugurated because its most powerful gun failed to fire.
With China now in full control of Scarborough, del Rosario compounded his initial mistake by lodging a legal case with the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). His legal staff should have warned him that an international tribunal assumes jurisdiction of a case only if the contending parties agree; and even if the tribunal proceeds without the other party, it has no mechanism to enforce its decision. To put bluntly, it was an exercise in futility. As expected, China refused to submit to arbitration, so our case was destined to rot in the ITLOS files. It will lie there and die there, like Mona Lisa in the song.
The futility of international arbitration
President Aquino asked President Obama to endorse our ITLOS case. Obama readily obliged. But what weight did his endorsement carry? Not even a moral one. The US had no moral stature to intervene because it is not a signatory to UNCLOS. And because China regards the US as its main adversary, Obama was the last person to influence Xi Jinping.
Amando Doronilla proposed to invite Vietnam to be a co-complainant. Vietnam astutely refused to join the Philippines in this futile game. Instead, Vietnam brought its case before the UN General Assembly. The General Assembly is another impotent body, but it is the best propaganda platform, much better than ITLOS. Knowing the futility of international arbitration, Vietnam responded in a language the Chinese could understand; the language of guerrilla warfare.
Vietnam has had a tussle with China long before us. In 1974 the Chinese forcibly expelled the Vietnamese from the Crescent Group of islands in the Paracels. At that time Vietnam had only a ragtag navy; since then, however, it has beefed up its navy, but along a different strategic concept. Retired Lt. Gen. Antonio Sotelo made an interesting observation that the Vietnamese navy, with its main force consisting of small but fast boats, prepared for guerrilla warfare in the sea.
Thus, when the Chinese put up an oil rig inside its exclusive economic zone, Vietnam engaged them in a bump-and-splash game. The small and fast Vietnamese vessels rammed the larger but sluggish Chinese ships. When the Chinese used water cannons, the Vietnamese also equipped their boats with water cannons. They persistently harassed the Chinese oil rig so it was unable to function. The Chinese had to withdraw the oil rig.
Compare this to the way we confronted the Chinese in Scarborough. We sent a few grey ships or military vessels, but the Chinese far outnumbered these with white ships or civilian vessels from their Maritime Law Enforcement Command and Maritime Surveillance Command, reinforced with research vessels and fishing boats. Had BRP Gregorio del Pilar opened fire, it would have brought in the Chinese navy to engage us in a conventional war, a kind of war we have no chance of winning.
Our government dared, apparently expecting America to come to our rescue. Unfortunately, the only support we got from the US were statements condemning Chinese behavior as “unacceptable.” The Vietnamese, by contrast, taking full responsibility for their own defense, displayed their capability engage the Chinese in low intensity conflict.
An unreliable ally
We should expect the same symbolic response from the US if we get into trouble in the Spratlys, especially under Joe Biden. I do not blame the US for extending only verbal support. We should blame ourselves for expecting more. America thinks primarily of its own interest. As a sovereign nation, we ought to fend for ourselves.
In 1975 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made this explicit in an electronic telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command (CINCPAC) 4. Under Article 5 of the Mutual Defense Treaty, he said, the US is committed to defend the Philippines only in the event of an armed attack on the “metropolitan territory.” The Spratlys do not belong to this category, he stressed. America regards the question of sovereignty over the Spratlys (including “Freedomland” or “Kalayaan”) as undetermined, and therefore it takes no position on the merits of the claims of various disputants.
Kissinger recalled that the Spratlys were not part of Philippine territory as ceded to the US by the 1898 treaty with Spain. When we negotiated the Mutual Defense Treaty, our panel did not assert a claim to any of the Spratly islands. The US maps accompanying the presentation of the Mutual Defense Treaty also excluded the Spratlys from the territories
4 This electronic telegram entitled “US MDT COMMITMENT AND SPRATLYS CINCPAC FOR POLAD” (dated 9 June 1975) is among the documents disclosed by Wikileaks.
covered. Kissinger concluded, “We do not see any legal basis for supporting the Philippine claim to the Spratlys.”
Let me quote his exact words: “Continuous, effective and uncontested occupation and administration of territory is a primary foundation for establishing sovereignty in absence of international settlement, but Philippine occupation could hardly be termed uncontested in the face of claims and protests of [the] Chinese and Vietnamese. ... As a practical matter, we see precious little chance that Congress or the American people would support US intervention in the Spratly dispute.”
Washington has not reversed this policy of Kissinger. After the lessons they learned in Afghanistan, it most unlikely that they will risk a war with China for the sake of the Philippines.
Conclusion
China is building fortresses in the Spratlys and the Paracels, but avoiding a frontal clash with the US. If its conflict with the US descends to the brink of war, China will employ economic rather than military weapons. The US is most vulnerable in this arena for reasons I mentioned earlier. We will be caught in the crossfire.
Both protagonists are using us for their own ends. The US is using us to implement “pivot to Asia,” while China treats us like a whipping boy to demonstrate to the other ASEAN countries that America is an undependable ally. Conscious that America still enjoys overwhelming military superiority, China will not attack metropolitan Philippines. But it can torment us in the South China Sea, knowing that the US is not going a risk war over these desolate islands.
America’s interest in Asia is temporary, but China’s is forever. We must learn how to live in peace with China. To find a way out of the trap del Rosario drove us into, the best option is to work with our ASEAN partners to negotiate a binding version of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. China may continue to refuse talking with the ASEAN as a bloc. But what is wrong with holding bilateral talks? The other ASEAN countries are already doing that, including Vietnam. China may agree to a multilateral conference if assured that the coastal states of Southeast Asia will not give the US a foothold in their territory.
Hosting US military facilities in our military camps, internationalizing the issue, and stirring up jingoism are foolhardy moves that might provoke China to seize the islands we occupy but cannot defend. It will also obstruct the quest for regional stability. We should, instead, uphold the spirit of our own constitution, which bans foreign troops from our soil. It is in our national interest to keep the South China Sea open to all maritime nations. The islets, shoals, reefs, cays and sandbars comprising the Spratlys are better left in the world’s commons, accessible to fisherfolks of whatever nationality.
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