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BUSINESS WORLD, January 26, 2014 10:15:33 PM
Introspective
By Romeo Bernardo
The way forward for the power industry
THE RECENT sharp spike in power rates led to the
understandable shock and anger of consumers; most are unfamiliar with the
structure and workings of a now market-based power industry. Headline news and
public discourse have generated more heat than light. It can be satisfying to
embrace conspiracy as a short-cut to thinking about a complex subject which the
ideologically opposed to privatization are quick to fan.
What is emerging though from various congress hearings
and submissions to the Supreme Court, is that this temporary two month spike
was a product of a most unlikely and unfortunate perfect storm of planned and
unplanned plant outages on top of already thin reserves. And what failures
there were arose not from collusion, but from a bid and offer system that
requires further refining, and perhaps, from insufficient diligence.
By way of disclosure, I was Undersecretary of Finance during the last two years of Aquino 1 and the first four years of Ramos administrations, an independent director in one major publicly listed power company and in an unlisted diversified holding company active in the energy business. While in government, I was involved in trying to addresss crippling blackouts in the early 1990’s that led the government to contract Independent Power Producers (IPPs) as part of the solution. Quick solutions had to be found -- the most expensive power was no power. Due to the outages, GDP flatlined for two years, 1990/92, lost output of P800 billion in today’s prices, equivalent to twice the cost of government’s infrastructure budget last year, or 20 years of its conditional cash transfer program. This is not even counting investments that were driven away, and the country’s lost momentum.
I resurrect this dark episode in Philippine economic history as a background to what may ensue if counterproductive actions are taken that lead to underinvestment yet again in power generation. Under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA; 2001) it is private sector players who are expected to deliver electricity under a competitive playing field, with government providing the enabling environment. This national policy was not arrived at willy-nilly but after seven years of debate both within the executive department and in Congress, with the active participation of all affected publics.
Modelled after successful privatizing countries, EPIRA was a recognition of the fiscal and institutional limitations of government in building and running power assets efficiently. As we know, such led to costly under-provision during the blackout years, and expensive stranded costs when the long-term growth forecasts failed to materialize post 1997 Asian Crisis.
Today many questions have been raised on whether EPIRA was a success. I submit that, while there has been a delay, a fair call is “so far, so good.” EPIRA has provided the framework for the restructuring of the Electric Power Industry, including privatization of National Power Corp.’s assets, defining the responsibilities of various government agencies and the private sector, and transitioning to a functioning competitive structure. The end goal was to make sure we had an ample and reliable supply of electricity, at reasonable and competitive rates.
What has happened since EPIRA was passed?
By way of disclosure, I was Undersecretary of Finance during the last two years of Aquino 1 and the first four years of Ramos administrations, an independent director in one major publicly listed power company and in an unlisted diversified holding company active in the energy business. While in government, I was involved in trying to addresss crippling blackouts in the early 1990’s that led the government to contract Independent Power Producers (IPPs) as part of the solution. Quick solutions had to be found -- the most expensive power was no power. Due to the outages, GDP flatlined for two years, 1990/92, lost output of P800 billion in today’s prices, equivalent to twice the cost of government’s infrastructure budget last year, or 20 years of its conditional cash transfer program. This is not even counting investments that were driven away, and the country’s lost momentum.
I resurrect this dark episode in Philippine economic history as a background to what may ensue if counterproductive actions are taken that lead to underinvestment yet again in power generation. Under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA; 2001) it is private sector players who are expected to deliver electricity under a competitive playing field, with government providing the enabling environment. This national policy was not arrived at willy-nilly but after seven years of debate both within the executive department and in Congress, with the active participation of all affected publics.
Modelled after successful privatizing countries, EPIRA was a recognition of the fiscal and institutional limitations of government in building and running power assets efficiently. As we know, such led to costly under-provision during the blackout years, and expensive stranded costs when the long-term growth forecasts failed to materialize post 1997 Asian Crisis.
Today many questions have been raised on whether EPIRA was a success. I submit that, while there has been a delay, a fair call is “so far, so good.” EPIRA has provided the framework for the restructuring of the Electric Power Industry, including privatization of National Power Corp.’s assets, defining the responsibilities of various government agencies and the private sector, and transitioning to a functioning competitive structure. The end goal was to make sure we had an ample and reliable supply of electricity, at reasonable and competitive rates.
What has happened since EPIRA was passed?
